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Abstract. In mean-payoff games, the objective of the protagonist is to ensure that the limit average
of an infinite sequence of numeric weights is nonnegative. In energy games, the objective is to ensure
that the running sum of weights is always nonnegative. Generalized mean-payoff and energy games
replace individual weights by tuples, and the limit average (resp. running sum) of each coordinate must
be (resp. remain) nonnegative. These games have applications in the synthesis of resource-bounded
processes with multiple resources.
We prove the finite-memory determinacy of generalized energy games and show the inter-reducibility of
generalized mean-payoff and energy games for finite-memory strategies. We also improve the computa-
tional complexity for solving both classes of games with finite-memory strategies: while the previously
best known upper bound was EXPSPACE, and no lower bound was known, we give an optimal coNP-
complete bound. For memoryless strategies, we show that the problem of deciding the existence of a
winning strategy for the protagonist is NP-complete.
1 Introduction
Graph games and multi-objectives. Two-player games on graphs are central in many applications
of computer science. For example, in the synthesis problem, implementations are obtained from
winning strategies in games with a qualitative objective such as ω-regular specifications [17, 16, 1].
In these applications, the games have a qualitative (boolean) objective that determines which player
wins. On the other hand, games with quantitative objective which are natural models in economics
(where players have to optimize a real-valued payoff) have also been studied in the context of
automated design [18, 9, 19]. In the recent past, there has been considerable interest in the design
of reactive systems that work in resource-constrained environments (such as embedded systems).
The specifications for such reactive systems are quantitative, and these give rise to quantitative
games. In most system design problems, there is no unique objective to be optimized, but multiple,
potentially conflicting objectives. For example, in designing a computer system, one is interested
not only in minimizing the average response time but also the average power consumption. In
this work we study such multi-objective generalizations of the two most widely used quantitative
objectives in games, namely, mean-payoff and energy objectives [10, 19, 6, 3].
Generalized mean-payoff games. A generalized mean-payoff game is played on a finite weighted
game graph by two players. The vertices of the game graph are partitioned into positions that
belong to Player 1 and positions that belong to Player 2. Edges of the graphs are labeled with
k-dimensional vectors w of integer values, i.e., w ∈ Zk. The game is played as follows. A pebble
is placed on a designated initial vertex of the game graph. The game is played in rounds in which
the player owning the position where the pebble lies moves the pebble to an adjacent position of
the graph using an outgoing edge. The game is played for an infinite number of rounds, resulting
in an infinite path through the graph, called a play. The value associated to a play is the mean
value in each dimension of the vectors of weights labeling the edges of the play. Accordingly, the
winning condition for Player 1 is defined by a vector of integer values v ∈ Zk that specifies a
threshold for each dimension. A play is winning for Player 1 if its vector of mean values is at
least v. All other plays are winning for Player 2, thus the game is zero-sum. We are interested in
the problem of deciding the existence of a finite-memory winning strategy for Player 1 in generalized
mean-payoff games. Note that in general infinite memory may be required to win generalized mean-
payoff games, but for practical applications such as the synthesis of reactive systems with multiple
resource constraints, the generalized mean-payoff games with finite memory is the relevant model.
Moreover, they provide the framework for the synthesis of specifications defined by [2, 8], and the
synthesis question for such specifications under regular (ultimately periodic) words correspond to
generalized mean-payoff games with finite-memory strategies.
Generalized energy games. In generalized energy games, the winning condition for Player 1 requires
that, given an initial credit v0 ∈ N
k, the sum of v0 and all the vectors labeling edges up to position
i in the play is nonnegative, for all i ∈ N. The decision problem for generalized energy games
asks whether there exists an initial credit v0 and a strategy for Player 1 to maintain the energy
nonnegative in all dimensions against all strategies of Player 2.
Contributions. In this paper, we study the strategy complexity and computational complexity of
solving generalized mean-payoff and energy games. Our contributions are as follows.
First, we show that generalized energy and mean-payoff games are determined when played with
finite-memory strategies, however, they are not determined for memoryless strategies. For gener-
alized energy games determinacy under finite-memory coincides with determinacy under arbitrary
strategies (each player has a winning strategy iff he has a finite-memory winning strategy). In
contrast, we show for generalized mean-payoff games that determinacy under finite-memory and
determinacy under arbitrary strategies do not coincide. Thus with finite-memory strategies these
games are determined, they correspond to the synthesis question with ultimately periodic words,
and enjoy pleasant mathematical properties like existence of the limit of the mean value of the
weights, and hence we focus on the study of generalized mean-payoff and energy games with finite-
memory strategies.
Second, we show that under the hypothesis that both players play either finite-memory or memo-
ryless strategies, the generalized mean-payoff game and the generalized energy game problems are
equivalent.
Third, our main contribution is the study of the computational complexity of the decision problems
for generalized mean-payoff games and generalized energy games, both for finite-memory strategies
and the special case of memoryless strategies. Our complexity results can be summarized as follows:
(A) For finite-memory strategies, we provide a nondeterministic polynomial time algorithm for
deciding negative instances of the problems4. Thus we show that the decision problems are in coNP.
This significantly improves the complexity as compared to the EXPSPACE algorithm that can be
obtained by reduction to Vass (vector addition systems with states) [4]. Furthermore, we establish
a coNP lower bound for these problems by reduction from the complement of the 3SAT problem,
hence showing that the problem is coNP-complete. (B) For the case of memoryless strategies, as the
games are not determined, we consider the problem of determining if Player 1 has a memoryless
winning strategy. First, we show that the problem of determining if Player 1 has a memoryless
winning strategy is in NP, and then show that the problem is NP-hard (i) even when the weights
are restricted to {−1, 0, 1}; or (ii) when the weights are arbitrary and the dimension is 2.
4 Negative instances are those where Player 1 is losing, and by determinacy under finite-memory where Player 2 is
winning.
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Related works. Mean-payoff games, which are the one-dimension version of our generalized mean-
payoff games, have been extensively studied starting with the works of Ehrenfeucht and Mycielski
in [10] where they prove memoryless determinacy for these games. Because of memoryless determi-
nacy, it is easy to show that the decision problem for mean-payoff games lies in NP ∩ coNP, but
despite large research efforts, no polynomial time algorithm is known for that problem. A pseudo-
polynomial time algorithm has been proposed by Zwick and Paterson in [19], and improved in [5].
The one-dimension special case of generalized energy games have been introduced in [6] and further
studied in [3] where log-space equivalence with classical mean-payoff games is established.
Generalized energy games can be viewed as games played on Vass (vector addition systems with
states) where the objective is to avoid unbounded decreasing of the counters. A solution to such
games on Vass is provided in [4] (see in particular Lemma 3.4 in [4]) with a PSPACE algorithm
when the weights are {−1, 0, 1}, leading to an EXPSPACE algorithm when the weights are arbitrary
integers. We drastically improve the EXPSPACE upper-bound by providing a coNP algorithm for
the problem, and we also provide a coNP lower bound even when the weights are restricted to
{−1, 0, 1}.
2 Generalized Mean-payoff and Energy Games
Well quasi-orders. Let D be a set. A relation  over D is a well quasi-order, wqo for short, if the
following holds: (a)  is transitive and reflexive; and (b) for all f : N → D, there exists i1, i2 ∈ N
such that i1 < i2 and f(i1)  f(i2).
Lemma 1. (Nk,≤) is well quasi-ordered.
Multi-weigthed two-player game structures. A multi-weigthed two-player game structure is
a tuple G = (S1, S2, sinit, E, k, w) where S1 ∩ S2 = ∅, and Si (i = 1, 2) is the finite set of Player i
positions, sinit ∈ S1 is the initial position, E ⊆ (S1 ∪ S2) × (S1 ∪ S2) is the set of edges such that
for all s ∈ S1 ∪ S2, there exists s
′ ∈ S1 ∪ S2 such that (s, s
′) ∈ E, k ∈ N is the dimension of the
multi-weights, w : E → Zk is the multi-weight labeling function. G is a multi-weighted one-player
game structure if S2 = ∅.
A play in G is an infinite sequence of pi = s0s1 . . . sn . . . such that (i) s0 = sinit, (ii) for all i ≥ 0
we have (si, si+1) ∈ E. A play pi = s0s1 . . . sn . . . is ultimately periodic if it can be decomposed as
pi = ρ1 · ρ
ω
2 where ρ1 and ρ2 are two finite sequences of positions. The prefix up to position n of a
play pi = s0s1 . . . sn . . . is the finite sequence pi(n) = s0s1 . . . sn, its last element sn is denoted by
Last(pi(n)). A prefix pi(n) belongs to Player i (i ∈ {1, 2}) if Last(pi(n)) ∈ Si. The set of plays in G
is denoted by Plays(G), the corresponding set of prefixes is denoted by Prefs(G), the set of prefixes
that belongs to Player i (i ∈ {1, 2}) is denoted by Prefsi(G), and the set of ultimately periodic
plays in G is denoted by Playsup(G).
The energy level vector of a prefix of play ρ = s0s1 . . . sn is EL(ρ) =
∑i=n−1
i=0 w(si, si+1), and the
mean-payoff vector of an ultimately periodic play pi = s0s1 . . . sn . . . isMP(pi) = limn→∞
1
n
EL(pi(n)).
Strategies. A strategy for Player i (i ∈ {1, 2}) in G is a function λi : Prefsi(G) → S1 ∪ S2 such
that for all ρ ∈ Prefsi(G) we have (Last(ρ), λi(ρ)) ∈ E. A play pi = s0s1 · · · ∈ Plays(G) is consistent
with a strategy λi of Player i if sj+1 = λi(s0s1 . . . sj) for all j ≥ 0 such that sj ∈ Si. The outcome
of a pair of strategies, λ1 for Player 1 and λ2 for Player 2, is the (unique) play which is consistent
with both λ1 and λ2. We denote outcomeG(λ1, λ2) this outcome.
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A strategy λ1 for Player 1 has finite-memory if it can be encoded by a deterministic Moore
machine (M,m0, αu, αn) where M is a finite set of states (the memory of the strategy), m0 ∈ M
is the initial memory state, αu : M × (S1 ∪ S2) → M is an update function, and αn : M × Si →
S1 ∪ S2 is the next-action function. If the game is in a Player-1 position s ∈ S1 and m ∈ M
is the current memory value, then the strategy chooses s′ = αn(m, s) as the next position and
the memory is updated to αu(m, s). Formally, 〈M,m0, αu, αn〉 defines the strategy λ such that
λ(ρ · s) = αn(αˆu(m0, ρ), s) for all ρ ∈ (S1 ∪ S2)
∗ and s ∈ S1, where αˆu extends αu to sequences
of positions as expected. A strategy is memoryless if |M | = 1. For a finite-memory strategy λ1 of
Player 1, let Gλ1 be the graph obtained as the product of G with the Moore machine defining λ1,
with initial vertex 〈m0, sinit〉 and where (〈m, s〉, 〈m
′, s′〉) is a transition in Gλ1 if m
′ = αu(m, s), and
either s ∈ S1 and s
′ = αn(m, s), or s ∈ S2 and (s, s
′) ∈ E. The set of inifinite paths in Gλ1 and the
set of plays consistent with λ1 coincide. A similar definition can be given for the case of Player 2.
Objectives. An objective for Player 1 in G is a set of plays W ⊆ Plays(G). A strategy λ1 for
Player 1 is winning for W in G if for all plays in pi ∈ Plays(G) that are consistent with λ1, we have
that pi ∈ W . A strategy λ2 for Player 2 is spoiling for W in G if for all plays in pi ∈ Plays(G) that
are consistent with λ2, we have that pi 6∈W . We consider the following objectives:
– Multi Energy objectives. Given an initial energy vector v0 ∈ N
k, the multi energy objective
PosEnergyG(v0) = {pi ∈ Plays(G) | ∀n ≥ 0 : v0 + EL(pi(n)) ∈ N
k} requires that the energy level
in all dimensions remains always nonnegative.
– Multi Mean-payoff objectives. Given a threshold vector v ∈ Zk, the multi mean-payoff objective
MeanPayoffG(v) = {pi ∈ Plays
up(G) | MP(pi) ≥ v} requires for all dimensions j the mean-payoff
for dimension j is at least v(j).
Decision problems. We consider the following decision problems:
– The unknown initial credit problem asks, given an multi-weighted two-player game structure G,
to decide whether there exists an initial credit vector v0 ∈ N
k and a winning strategy λ1 for
Player 1 for the objective PosEnergyG(v0).
– The mean-payoff threshold problem (for finite memory) asks, given an multi-weighted two-player
game structure G and a threshold vector v ∈ Zk, to decide whether there exists a finite-
memory strategy λ1 for Player 1 such that for all finite-memory strategies λ2 of Player 2,
outcomeG(λ1, λ2) ∈ MeanPayoffG(v).
Note that in the unknown initial credit problem, we allow arbitrary strategies (and we show in
Theorem 2 that actually finite-memory strategies are sufficient), while in the mean-payoff threshold
problem, we require finite-memory strategy which is restriction (according to Theorem 4) of a more
general problem of deciding the existence of arbitrary winning strategies.
Determinacy and determinacy under finite-memory. A game G with an objective W is
determined if either Player 1 has a winning strategy, or Player 2 has a spoiling strategy. A game G
with an objective W is determined under finite-memory if either (a) Player 1 has a finite-memory
strategy λ1 such that for all finite-memory strategies λ2 of Player 2, we have outcomeG(λ1, λ2) ∈W ;
or (b) Player 2 has a finite-memory strategy λ2 such that for all finite-memory strategies λ1
of Player 1, we have outcomeG(λ1, λ2) 6∈ W . Games with objectives W are determined (resp.
determined under finite-memory) if all game structures with objectives W are determined (resp.
determined under finite-memory). We say that determinacy and determined under finite-memory
coincide for a class of objectives, if for all objectives in the class and all game structures, the answer
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of the determinacy and determined under finite-memory coincide (i.e., Player 1 has a winning
strategy iff there is a finite-memory winning strategy, and similarly for Player 2). Generalized
mean-payoff and energy objectives are measurable: (a) generalized mean-payoff objectives can be
expressed as finite intersection of mean-payoff objectives and mean-payoff objectives are complete
for the third level of Borel hierarchy [7]; and (b) generalized energy objectives can be expressed as
finite intersection of energy objectives, and enery objectives are closed sets. Hence determinacy of
generalized mean-payoff and energy games follows from the result of [14].
Theorem 1 (Determinacy [14]). Generalized mean-payoff and energy games are determined.
3 Determinacy under Finite-memory and Inter-reducibility
In this section, we establish four results. First, we show that to win generalized energy games, it
is sufficient for Player 1 to play finite-memory strategies. Second, we show that to spoil general-
ized energy games, it is sufficient for Player 2 to play memoryless strategies. As a consequence,
generalized energy games are determined under finite-memory. Third, using this finite-memory de-
terminacy result, we show that the decision problems for generalized energy and mean-payoff games
(see Section 2) are log-space inter-reducible. Finally, we show that infinite-memory strategies are
more powerful than finite-memory strategies in generalized mean-payoff games.
For generalized energy games, we first show that finite-memory strategies are sufficient for
Player 1, and then that memoryless strategies are sufficient for Player 2.
Lemma 2. For all multi-weighted two-player game structures G, the answer to the unknown initial
credit problem is Yes iff there exists a initial credit v0 ∈ N
k and a finite-memory strategy λFM1 for
Player 1 such that for all strategies λ2 of Player 2, outcomeG(λ
FM
1 , λ2) ∈ PosEnergyG(v0).
Proof. One direction is trivial. For the other direction, assume that λ1 is a (not necessary finite-
memory) winning strategy for Player 1 in G with initial credit v0 ∈ N
k. We show how to construct
from λ1 a finite-memory strategy λ
FM
1 which is winning against all strategies of Player 2 for initial
credit v0. For that we consider the unfolding of the game graph G in which Player 1 plays according
to λ1. This infinite tree, noted TG(λ1), has as set of nodes all the prefixes of plays in G when
Player 1 plays according to λ1. We associate to each node ρ = s0s1 . . . sn in this tree the energy
vector v0 + EL(ρ). As λ1 is winning, we have that v0 + EL(ρ) ∈ N
k for all ρ. Now, consider the
set (S1 ∪ S2) × N
k, and the relation ⊑ on this set defined as follows: (s1, v1) ⊑ (s2, v2) iff s1 = s2
and v1 ≤ v2 i.e., for all i, 1 ≤ i ≤ k, v1(i) ≤ v2(i). The relation ⊑ is a wqo (easy consequence
of Lemma 1). As a consequence, on every infinite branch pi = s0s1 . . . sn . . . of TG(λ1), there exists
two positions i < j such that Last(pi(i)) = Last(pi(j)) and EL(pi(i)) ≤ EL(pi(j)). We say that node
j subsumes node i. Now, let T FM
G(λ1)
be the tree TG(λ1) where we stop each branch when we reach
a node n2 which subsumes one of its ancestor node n1. Clearly, T
FM
G(λ1)
is finite. Also, it is easy to
see that Player 1 can play in the subtree rooted at n2 as she plays in the subtree rooted in n1
because its energy level in n2 is greater than in n1. From T
FM
G(λ1)
, we can construct a Moore machine
which encode a finite-memory strategy λFM1 which is winning the generalized energy game G as it
is winning for initial energy level v0.
Lemma 3. [4] For all multi-weigthed two-player game structures G, the answer to the unknown
initial credit problem is No if and only if there exists a memoryless strategy λ2 for Player 2,
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q0q1 q2
(0, 0)
(0, 0)
(−1, 1)
(1,−1)
(−2, 0)
Fig. 1. Player 1 (round states) wins with initial credit (2, 0) when Player 2 (square states) can use memoryless
strategies, but not when Player 2 can use arbitrary strategies.
such that for all initial credit vectors v0 ∈ N
k and all strategies λ1 for Player 1 we have
outcomeG(λ1, λ2) 6∈ PosEnergyG(v0).
Proof. The proof was given in [4][Lemma 19]. Intuitively, consider a Player-2 state s ∈ S2 with
two sucessors s′, s′′. If an initial credit vector v′0 is sufficient for Player 1 to win against Player-2
always choosing s′, and v′′0 is sufficient against Player-2 always choosing s
′′, then v′0+v
′′
0 is sufficient
against Player-2 arbitrarily alternating between s′ and s′′. This is because of the fact that if Player 1
maintains all energies nonnegative when initial credit is v0, then he can maintain all energies above
∆ when initial credit is v0 +∆ (∆ ∈ N
k).
As a consequence of the two previous lemmas, we have the following theorem.
Theorem 2. Generalized energy games are determined under finite-memory, and determinacy co-
incide with determinacy under finite-memory for generalized energy games.
Remark 1. Note that even if Player 2 can be restricted to play memoryless strategies in generalized
energy games, it may be that Player 1 is winning with some initial credit vector v0 when Player 2
is memoryless, and is not winning with the same initial credit vector v0 when Player 2 can use
arbitrary strategies. This situation is illustrated in Fig. 1 where Player 1 (owning round states) can
maintain the energy nonegative in all dimensions with initial credit (2, 0) when Player 2 (owning
square states) is memoryless. Indeed, either Player 2 chooses the left edge from q0 to q1 and Player 1
wins, or Player 2 chooses the right edge from q0 to q2, and Player 1 wins as well by alternating the
edges back to q0. Now, if Player 2 has memory, then Player 2 wins by choosing first the right edge
to q2, which forces Player 1 to come back to q0 with multi-weight (−1, 1). The energy level is now
(1, 1) in q0 and Player 2 chooses the left edge to q1 which is losing for Player 1. Note that Player 1
wins with initial credit (2, 1) and (3, 0) (or any larger credit) against all arbitrary strategies of
Player 2.
We now show that generalized mean-payoff games (where players are restricted to play finite-
memory strategies by definition) are log-space equivalent to generalized energy games. First note
that the mean-payoff threshold problem with threshold vector v ∈ Zk can be reduced to the mean-
payoff threshold problem with threshold vector {0}k, by shifting all multi-weights in the game
graph by v (which has the effect of shifting the mean-payoff value by v). Given this reduction, the
following result shows that the unknown initial credit problem (for multi-energy games) and the
mean-payoff threshold problem (with finite-memory strategies) are equivalent.
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Theorem 3. For all multi-weigthed two-player game structures G with dimension k, the answer
to the unknown initial credit problem is Yes if and only if the answer to the mean-payoff threshold
problem (for finite memory) with threshold vector {0}k is Yes.
Proof. First, assume that there exists a winning strategy λ1 for Player 1 in G for the multi energy
objective PosEnergyG(v0) (for some v0). Theorem 2 establishes that finite memory is sufficient to
win multi-energy games, so we can assume that λ1 has finite memory. Consider the restriction of
the graph Gλ1 to the reachable vertices, and we show that the energy vector of every simple cycle
is nonnegative. By contradcition, if there exists a simple cycle with energy vector negative in one
dimension, then the infinite path that reaches this cycle and loops through it forever would violate
the objective PosEnergyG(v0) regardless of the vector v0.
Now, this shows that every reachable cycle in Gλ1 has nonnegative mean-payoff value in all
dimensions, hence λ1 is winning for the multi mean-payoff objective MeanPayoffG({0}
k).
Second, assume that there exists a finite-memory strategy λ1 for Player 1 that is winning in G
for the multi mean-payoff objective MeanPayoffG({0}
k). By the same argument as above, all simple
cycles in Gλ1 are nonnegative and the strategy λ1 is also winning for the objective PosEnergyG(v0)
for some v0. Taking v0 = {nW}
k where n is the number of states in Gλ1 (which bounds the length
of the acyclic paths) and W ∈ Z is the largest weight in the game suffices.
Note that the result of Theorem 3 does not hold for arbitrary strategies as shown in the following
lemma.
Lemma 4. In generalized mean-payoff games, infinite memory may be necessary to win (finite-
memory strategies may not be sufficient).
Proof. To show this, we first need to define the mean-payoff vector of arbitrary plays (because
arbitrary strategies, i.e., infinite-memory strategies, may produce non-ultimately periodic plays).
In particular, the limit of 1
n
· EL(pi(n)) for n → ∞ may not exist for arbitrary plays pi. Therefore,
two possible definitions are usually considered, namely either MP(pi) = lim infn→∞
1
n
· EL(pi(n)),
or MP(pi) = lim supn→∞
1
n
· EL(pi(n)). In both cases, better payoff can be obtained with infinite
memory: the example of Fig. 2 shows a game where all states belong to Player 1. We claim that
(a) for MP, Player 1 can achieve a threshold vector (1, 1), and (b) for MP, Player 1 can achieve
a threshold vector (2, 2); (c) if we restrict Player 1 to use a finite-memory strategy, then it is not
possible to win the multi mean-payoff objective with threshold (1, 1) (and thus also not with (2, 2)).
To prove (a), consider the strategy that visits n times qa and then n times qb, and repeats this
forever with increasing value of n. This guarantees a mean-payoff vector (1, 1) for MP because in
the long-run roughly half of the time is spent in qa and roughly half of the time in qb. To prove (b),
consider the strategy that alternates visits to qa and qb such that after the nth alternation, the
self-loop on the visited state q (q ∈ {qa, qb}) is taken so many times that the average frequency of
q gets larger than 1
n
in the current finite prefix of the play. This is always possible and achieves
threshold (2, 2) for MP. Note that the above two strategies require infinite memory. To prove (c),
notice that finite-memory strategies produce an ultimately periodic play and therefore MP and MP
coincide with MP. It is easy to see that such a play cannot achieve (1, 1) because the periodic part
would have to visit both qa and qb and then the mean-payoff vector (v1, v2) of the play would be
such that v1 + v2 < 2 and thus v1 = v2 = 1 is impossible.
Theorem 3 and Lemma 4, along with Theorem 2 gives the following result.
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qa qb
(2, 0) (0, 2)
(0, 0)
(0, 0)
Fig. 2. A generalized mean-payoff game where infinite memory is necessary to win (Lemma 4).
Theorem 4. Generalized mean-payoff games are determined under finite-memory, however deter-
minacy and determined under finite-memory do not coincide for generalized mean-payoff games.
4 coNP-completeness for Finite-Memory Strategies
In this section, we present a nondeterministic polynomial time algorithm to recognize the instances
for which there is no winning strategies for Player 1 in a multi-energy game. First, we show that
the one-player version of this game can be solved by checking the existence of a circuit (i.e., a not
necessarily simple cycle) with overall nonnegative effect in all dimensions. Second, we build on this
and the memoryless result for Player 2 to define a coNP algorithm. The main result (Theorem 5)
is derived from Lemma 6 and Lemma 7 below.
Theorem 5. The unknown initial credit and the mean-payoff threshold problems for multi-weighted
two-player game structures are coNP-complete.
coNP upper bound. First, we need the following result about finding zero circuits in multi-
weighted directed graphs (a graph is a one-player game). A zero circuit is a finite sequence s0s1 . . . sn
such that s0 = sn, (si, si+1) ∈ E for all 0 ≤ i < n, and
∑n−1
i=0 w(si, si+1) = (0, 0, . . . , 0). The circuit
need not be simple.
Lemma 5 ([13]). Determining if a k-dimensional directed graph contains a zero circuit can be
done in polynomial time.
Lemma 6. The unknown initial credit and the mean-payoff threshold problems for multi-weighted
two-player game structures are in coNP.
Proof. By Lemma 3, we know that Player 2 can be restricted to play memoryless strategies. A
coNP algorithm can guess a memoryless strategy λ and check in polynomial time that it is winning
using the following argument.
First, consider the graph Gλ as a one-player game (in which all states belong to player 1.
We show that if there exists an initial energy level v0 and an infinite play pi = s0s1 . . . sn . . . in
Gλ such that pi ∈ PosEnergy(v0) then there exist a reachable circuit in Gλ that has nonnegative
effect in all dimensions. To show that, we extend pi with the energy information as follows: pi′ =
(s0, w0)(s1, w1) . . . (sn, wn) . . . where w0 = v0 and for all i ≥ 1, wi = v0 + EL(pi(i)). As pi ∈
PosEnergy(v0), we know that for all i ≥ 0, wi ∈ N
k. So, we can define the following order on the
pairs (s,w) ∈ (S1∪S2)×N
k in the run: (s,w) ⊑ (s′, w′) iff s = s′ and w(j) ≤ w′(j) for all 1 ≤ j ≤ k.
From Lemma 1, it is easy to show that ⊑ is a wqo. Then there exist two positions i1 < i2 in pi
′
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such that (si1 , wi1) ⊑ (si2 , wi2). The circuit underlying those two positions has nonnegative effect
in all dimensions.
Based on this, we can decide if there exists an initial energy vector v0 and an infinite path in
Gλ that satisfies PosEnergyG(v0) using the result of Lemma 5 on modified version of Gλ obtained
as follows. In every state of Gλ, we add k self-loops with respective multi-weight (−1, 0, . . . , 0),
(0,−1, 0, . . . , 0), . . . , (0, . . . , 0,−1), i.e. each self-loop removes one unit of energy in one dimension.
It is easy to see that Gλ has a circuit with nonnegative effect in all dimensions if and only if the
modified Gλ has a zero circuit, which can be determined in polynomial time. The result follows.
Lower bound: coNP-hardness. We show that the unknown initial credit problem for multi-
weighted two-player game structures is coNP-hard. We present a reduction from the complement
of the 3SAT problem which is NP-complete [15].
Hardness proof. We show that the problem of deciding whether Player 1 has a winning strategy
for the unknown initial credit problem for multi-weighted two-player game structures is at least as
hard as deciding whether a 3SAT formula is unsatisfiable. Consider a 3SAT formula ψ in CNF with
clauses C1, C2, . . . , Ck over variables {x1, x2, . . . , xn}, where each clause consists of disjunctions of
exactly three literals (a literal is a variable or its complement). Given the formula ψ, we construct a
game graph as shown in Figure 3. The game graph is as follows: from the initial position, Player 1
chooses a clause, then from a clause Player 2 chooses a literal that appears in the clause (i.e.,
makes the clause true). From every literal the next position is the initial position. We now describe
the multi-weight labeling function w. In the multi-weight function there is a component for every
literal. For edges from the initial position to the clause positions, and from the clause positions
to the literals, the weight for every component is 0. We now define the weight function for the
edges from literals back to the initial position: for a literal y, and the edge from y to the initial
position, the weight for the component of y is 1, the weight for the component of the complement
of y is −1, and for all the other components the weight is 0. We now define a few notations related
to assignments of truth values to literals. We consider assignments that assign truth values to all
the literals. An assignment is valid if for every literal the truth value assigned to the literal and its
complement are complementary (i.e., for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n, if xi is assigned true (resp. false), then the
complement xi of xi is assigned false (resp. true)). An assignment that is not valid is conflicting
(i.e., for some 1 ≤ i ≤ n, both xi and xi are assigned the same truth value). If the formula ψ is
satisfiable, then there is a valid assignment that satisfies all the clauses. If the formula ψ is not
satisfiable, then every assignment that satisfies all the clauses must be conflicting. We now present
two directions of the hardness proof.
ψ satisfiable implies Player 2 winning. We show that if ψ is satisfiable, then Player 2 has a mem-
oryless winning strategy. Since ψ is satisfiable, there is a valid assignment A that satisfies every
clause. The memoryless strategy is constructed from the assignment A as follows: for a clause Ci,
the strategy chooses a literal as successor that appears in Ci and is set to true by the assignment.
Consider an arbitrary strategy for Player 1, and the infinite play: the literals visited in the play
are all assigned truth values true by A, and the infinite play must visit some literal infinitely often.
Consider the literal x that appears infinitely often in the play, then the complement literal x is
never visited, and every time literal x is visited, the component corresponding to x decreases by 1,
and since x appears infinitely often it follows that the play is winning for Player 2 for every finite
initial credit. It follows that the strategy for Player 2 is winning, and the answer to the unknown
initial credit problem is “No”.
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Fig. 3. Game graph construction for a 3SAT formula (Lemma 7).
ψ not satisfiable implies Player 1 is winning. We now show that if ψ is not satisfiable, then Player 1
is winning. By determinacy, it suffices to show that Player 2 is not winning, and by existence of
memoryless winning strategy for Player 2 (Lemma 3), it suffices to show that there is no memoryless
winning strategy for Player 2. Fix an arbitrary memoryless strategy for Player 2, (i.e., in every clause
Player 2 chooses a literal that appears in the clause). If we consider the assignment A obtained
from the memoryless strategy, then since ψ is not satisfiable it follows that the assignment A is
conflicting. Hence there must exist clause Ci and Cj and variable xk such that the strategy chooses
the literal xk in Ci and the complement variable xk in Cj. The strategy for Player 1 that at the
starting position alternates between clause Ci and Cj , along with that the initial credit of 1 for the
component of xk and xk, and 0 for all other components, ensures that the strategy for Player 2 is
not winning. Hence the answer to the unknown initial credit problem is “Yes”, and we have the
following result.
Lemma 7. The unknown initial credit and the mean-payoff threshold problems for multi-weighted
two-player game structures are coNP-hard.
Observe that our hardness proof works with weights restricted to the set {−1, 0, 1}.
5 NP-completeness for Memoryless Strategies
In this section we consider the unknown initial credit and the mean-payoff threshold problems for
multi-weighted two-player game structures when Player 1 is restricted to use memoryless strategies.
We will show NP-completeness for these problems.
Lemma 8. The unknown intial credit and the mean-payoff threshold problems for multi-weighted
two-player game structures for memoryless strategies for Player 1 lie in NP.
Proof. The inclusion in NP is obtained as follows: the polynomial witness is the memoryless strategy
for Player 1, and once the strategy is fixed we obtain a game graph with choices for Player 2 only.
The verification problem for the unknown initial credit checks that for every dimension there is
no negative cycle, and the verification problem for mean-payoff threshold checks that for every
dimension every cycle satisfy the threshold condition. Both the above verification problem can be
achieved in polynomial time by solving the energy-game and mean-payoff game problem on graphs
with choices for Player 2 only [12, 3, 6]. The desired result follows.
10
Lemma 9 shows NP-hardness for dimension k = 2 and arbitrary integral weights, and is obtained
by a reduction from the Knapsack problem. If k = 1, then the problems reduces to the classical
energy and mean-payoff games, and is in NP ∩ coNP [3, 6, 19] (so the hardness result cannot be
obtained for k = 1).
Lemma 9. The unknown intial credit and the mean-payoff threshold problems for multi-weighted
two-player game structures for memoryless strategies for Player 1 are NP-hard, even in one-player
game structures with dimension k = 2 for the weight function.
Proof. We present a reduction from the Knapsack problem. The Knapsack problem consists of
a set I = {1, 2, . . . , n} of n items, for each item i there is a profit pi ∈ N and a weight wi ∈ N.
Given a weight bound B and profit bound P , the Knapsack problem asks whether there exists
a subset J ⊆ I of items such that (a)
∑
j∈J wj ≤ B; and (b)
∑
j∈J pj ≥ P (i.e., a profit of
P can be accumulated without exceeding weight B). The Knapsack problem is NP-hard [15].
Our reduction is as follows: given an instance of the Knapsack problem we construct a one-
player game structure with a weight function of dimension 2. The set of positions is as follows:
S1 = I ∪ {(i, j)|i ∈ I, j ∈ {Y,N}} ∪ {n + 1} and S2 = ∅. The set of edges is as follows: E =
{(i, (i, Y )), (i, (i,N)) | i ∈ I} ∪ {((i, Y ), i + 1), ((i,N), i + 1) | i ∈ I} ∪ {(n + 1, 1)}. Intuitively, in
the game structure, for every item Player 1 has a choice of “Yes” (edge from i to (i, Y )) to select
item i, and choice of “No” (edge from i to (i,N)) to not select item i. From (i, Y ) and (i,N) the
next position is i + 1, and from the position n + 1 the next position is 1. The weight function
function w : E → Z2 has two dimensions: (a) for edge e = (i, (i,N)) we have w(e) = (0, 0) (i.e., for
the choice of “No” all the weights are 0); (b) for an edge e = (i, (i, Y )) we have w(e) = (pi,−wi)
(i.e., for the choice of “Yes”, the first component gains the profit and the second component loses
the weight of item i); (c) for an edge e = ((i, Y ), i + 1) or e = ((i,N), i + 1) we have w(e) = 0;
and (d) for the edge e = (n + 1, 1) we have w(e) = (−P,B) (i.e., there is a loss of P in the first
component and a gain of B in the second component). The construction is illustrated in Fig 4.
Given a solution J for the Knapsack problem, the memoryless strategy that choose (j, (j, Y )) for
j ∈ J , and (j′, (j′, N)) for j′ ∈ I \ J , with intial credit (0, B) is a solution for the unknown initial
credit problem. Conversely, given a memoryless strategy λ1 for the unknown initial credit problem,
the set J = {j ∈ I | λ1(j) = (j, Y )} is a solution to the Knapsack problem. The argument for the
mean-payoff threshold problem is analogous. The result follows.
In Lemma 10 we show the hardness of the problem when the weights are in {−1, 0, 1}, but the
dimension is arbitrary. It has been shown in [11] that if the weights are {−1, 0, 1} and the dimension
is 2, then the problem can be solved in polynomial time.
Lemma 10. The unknown intial credit and the mean-payoff threshold problems for multi-weighted
two-player game structures for memoryless strategies for Player 1 are NP-hard, even in one-player
game structures when weights are restricted to {−1, 0, 1}.
Proof. We present a reduction from the 3SAT problem. Consider a 3SAT formula Φ over a set
X = {x1, x2, . . . , xn} of variables, and a set C1, C2, . . . , Cm of clauses such that each clause has
3-literals (a literal is a variable or its complement). We construct a one-player game structure with
a weight function of dimension m from Φ. The set of positions is S1 = X ∪ {(xi, j) | xi ∈ X, j ∈
{T, F}} ∪ {xn+1} and S2 = ∅. The set of edges is as follows: E = {(xi, (xi, T )), (xi, (xi, F )) | xi ∈
X} ∪ {((xi, T ), xi+1), ((xi, F ), xi+1) | xi ∈ X} ∪ {(xn+1, x1)}. Intuitively, in the game structure,
11
1(1, Y )
(1, N)
2
(2, Y )
(2, N)
3 n
(n, Y )
(n,N)
n+ 1
(p1,−w1)
(0, 0)
(0, 0)
(0, 0)
(p2,−w2)
(0, 0)
(0, 0)
(0, 0)
(pn,−wn)
(0, 0)
(0, 0)
(0, 0)
(−P,B) to 1
Fig. 4. Knapsack Reduction.
for every variable Player 1 has a choice to set xi as “True” (edge from xi to (xi, T )), and choice
to set xi as “False” (edge from xi to (xi, F )). From (xi, T ) and (xi, F ) the next position is xi+1,
and from the position xn+1 the next position is x1. The construction of the graph is similar as in
Fig 4. The weight function w : E → Zm has m dimensions: (a) for an edge e = (xi, (xi, T )) (resp.
e = (xi, (xi, F ))) and 1 ≤ k ≤ m, the k-th component of w(e) is 1 if the choice xi as “True” (resp.
“False”) satisfies clause Ck, and otherwise the k-th component is 0; (b) for edges e = ((xi, j), xi+1),
with j ∈ {T, F}, every component of w(e) is 0; and (c) for the edge e = (xn+1, x1), for all 1 ≤ k ≤ m,
the k-th component of w(e) = −1. If Φ is satisfiable, then consider a satisfying assignment A,
and we construct a memoryless strategy λ1 as follows: for a position xi, if A(xi) is “True”, then
choose (xi, T ), otherwise choose (xi, F ). The memoryless strategy λ1 with initial credit vector {0}
m
ensures that the answer to the unknown initial credit problem for memoryless strategies is “Yes”.
Conversely, if there is a memoryless strategy λ1 for the unknown initial credit problem, then the
memoryless strategy must satisfy every clause. A satisfying assignment A for Φ is as follows: A(xi)
is “True” if λ1(xi) = (xi, T ), and “False”, otherwise. It follows that Φ is satisfiable iff the answer
to the unknown initial credit problem for memoryless strategies is “Yes”. The argument for the
mean-payoff threshold problem is analogous. The desired result follows.
The following theorem follows from the results of Lemma 8, Lemma 9 and Lemma 10.
Theorem 6. The unknown initial credit and the mean-payoff threshold problems for multi-weighted
two-player game structures for memoryless strategies for Player 1 are NP-complete.
6 Conclusion
In this work we considered games with multiple mean-payoff and energy objectives, and established
determinacy under finite-memory, inter-reducibility of these two classes of games for finite-memory
strategies, and improved the complexity bounds from EXPSPACE to coNP-complete.
Two interesting problems are open: (A) for generalized mean-payoff games, the winning strate-
gies with infinite memory are more powerful than finite-memory strategies, and the complexity of
solving generalized mean-payoff games with infinite-memory strategies remains open. (B) it is not
knwon how to compute the exact or approximate Pareto curve (trade-off curve) for multi-objective
mean-payoff and energy games.
Acknowledgement. We are grateful to Jean Cardinal for pointing the reference [13].
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